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Senate 
MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1967 
ESCALATION OF VIETNAM WAR 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, bomb-
ing within 10 miles or 1 minute away 
from China's border is a very dangerous 
extenion of the war. It brings us that 
much closer to the brink of a possible 
confrontation with China which could 
be made probable thnugh a miscalcula-
tion, an error, or otherwise. 
TI1e closer we get to China increases 
the possibility of such a confrontation 
and also enhances the chances that the 
internal difficulties which beset China 
today, and have for some months past, 
will be either forgotten or put aside and 
all factions in China will be drawn to-
gether as one. Let no one fool himself as 
to what a confrontation with China 
would mean, because it would bring 
about a drastic revision at home through 
a tax increase well beyond the 10 percent 
proposed. It would call for price and 
wage controls. It would bring about a 
stepped-up draft call and make manda-
tory a callup of the Reserves and the 
National Guard. 
There have also been suggestions on 
the last day or so that the mining or 
quarantining of Haiphong could be 
something we could do with a minimum 
of mines and manpower. Should we un-
dertake this highly questionable move, it 
would create the possibility of a confron-
t·. , ' n with the Soviet Union. The impli-
caLions of these two moves could bring 
about retali,atory measures in Korea, 
Berlin, and elsewhere. It woultl be well 
for all of us to consider the po.;sib!li ties, 
probabilities, and implications inherent 
in the first tactic now underway and the 
second which has been suggested by 
high-ranking military and congressional 
leaders. 
It is my understanding that proposals 
have been made by some to the effect 
that bombing of the north should be 
stepped up to get at the point of origin of 
men and supplies. In my judgment, it 
would be far more preferable to consoli-
date and concentrate our activities to 
South Vietnam and to follow through on 
the Cooper formula to interdict the flow 
of men and materiel along the Ho Chi 
Minh trails at the point·of penetration at 
the 17th parallel in Laos and Vietnam 
and to extend the defensive barrier along 
the parallel across the demilitarized zone 
into Laos. 
It appears to me that our latest move 
and latest s.uggestions, if implemented, 
would only serve to stiffen Hanoi's spine, 
keep h er further away from the confer-
ence table, and make the possibility of a 
negotiated peace much more difficult to 
achieve. 
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